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I. Statement of the Case
l. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent
in an action for partition of real estate located in Madison County, Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 6-501 et seq.
2. Course of the Proceedings.
Madison Real Property, LLC, hereafter referred to as "MRP" filed its complaint for
partition and an accounting on April 4, 2008. R. Vol. 1., p. 6. Marilynn Thomason, the appellant,
hereafter referred to as "Thomason", and Byron Thomason were served the summons and
complaint on April 4, 2008. R. Vol. ] ., p. 6. Nicholas and Sandra Thomason were served the
summons and complaint on April 5, 2008. R. Vol. 1., p. 6. Defendants Marilynn Thomson and
Byron Thomason filed their answers to MRP's complaint on April 24, 2008. R. Vol. 1., p. 6.
Defendants Nicholas and Sa.11dra Thomason filed their answers to plaintiffs complaint on April
25, 2008. R. Vol. 1., p. 6.
Defendants Marilynn and Byron Thomason filed a motion to dismiss on May 27, 2008,
which was denied by an order of the court on June 16, 2008. R. Vol. 1., p. 6.
On July 7, 2008 Nicholas Thomason filed a Notice of Service of his First Request for
Production to Plaintiff. R. Vol. 1., p. 6. That saine date Byron Thomason filed his Notice of
Service of Defendant Byron T. Thomason' s First Request for Admissions to the Plaintiff. R. Vol.
1., p. 7. On July 3], 2008 MRP filed its Notice of Compliance with Defendant Byron T.
Thomason's First and Second Requests for Admission, and its Notice of Compliance with
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Defendant Nicholas A. Thomason's First Request for Production. R. Vol. 1., p. 7. The
Thomasons have not served any other discovery requests at any time.
On July ] ] , 2008, MRP filed and served on the Thomasons its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment in which it asked the district court to enter judgment on the issue of
ownership of the subject real estate, including the respective rights of the parties in the property.
That the court order a physical partition of the subject property and appointment of referees and
the right of the plaintiff to receive an accounting for all receipts and disbursements received and
made on account of said property from October 30, 2001, or for such other use made of the
property by defendants. A Notice of Hearing scheduled for August ] 8, 2008 was filed and served
on the Thomasons. Record of Action, p. 21, R, Vol. 2., p. 239-240. MRP also filed and served an
Affidavit in support of its motion and a Brief in support of its motion on July 11, 2008. R. Vol.
1., p. 7. No objections, briefs, affidavits or other opposition to the motion for summary judgment
were filed by the Thomasons. Record of Action, p. 2 and 3. On August 15, 2008, a motion for
continuance was filed by Byron and Marilynn Thomason. Record of Action, p. 2. R. Vol. 3., pp.
308,327. The hearing on MRP's motion for partial summary judgment was held on August 18,
2008. Record of Action, p. 2. The motion for continuance by Byron and Marilynn Thomason was
denied, the district court finding that it was not timely nor supported by argument. R. Vol. 2., p.

243. On August 22, 2008, the district court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

1

The Register of Action is located in both Volumes 1. of the Clerk's Record and is
separately paginated.
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Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. R. Vol.
court entered an Order Appointing Referees. R.
district court entered an Order Awarding Attorney's

p.

On September 8, 2008 the district

p.

. On September 16, 2008 the

R. Vol. 2., p. 268.

and

Thomasons filed a Notice of Appeal on October 1, 2008. R. Vol. 3., p. 284. This appeal
was conditionally dismissed by the Supreme Court as untimely on October 16, 2008. On
'Kovember 20, 2008, this appeal was finally dismissed. R. Vol.
On October 6, 2008, the Thomasons filed a Motion for

pp.

672. 683.

of Judgment, New

Trial/Hearing, to Amend Findings and Conclusions, Amend Judgment and All Other Authority.
Register of Actions, p. 3. MRP filed its Reply and Objection to the Thomasons' Motions on
October 14, 2008. Register of Action, p. 3 and R. Vol. 4., p.
Thomasons· various motions on October 20. 2008. Record

hearing was held on the
Actions, p.

The district court

entered its Order denying Thomasons' Motions and granting MRP attorney's fees on October 20.
2008. R. Vol. 4. p. 667.
Pursuant to its findings in its October 20, 2008 Order, the district court issued a Second
Order Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs on November 14, 2008. R. VoL 2., p. 670.
The referees filed their report with the district court on December 2, 2008. R. Vol. 4 .. p.
623. MRP filed a Motion for Order Confirming the Referees Report and for Judgment on
December 19, 2008. R. Vol. 4., p. 794. On December 29, 2009, Thornasons filed an Objection to
Plaintiffs Motion and a Motion to Reschedule the hearing which had been set for January 5,
2009. R. Vol. 1 (2012) ROA, p. 4. The hearing was subsequently reset.
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hearing was held on

the motion on April 27. 2009. R. Vol. 4. p. 700. The district court entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order confirming the referees' report on June 12, 2009. R. Vol. 4, p. 707.
On December 23, 2008, Thomasons filed their second Notice of Appeal. R. Vol. 4, p.
684. The second appeal was conditionally dismissed on May 28, 2009. R. Vol 4, p. 705. The
second appeal was again conditionally dismissed on February 3, 2010, and finally dismissed on
March 3,2010. R. Vol. 1(2012), p. 62, 65. On March 12, 2010. the Thomasons filed a Joint
Motion for Reconsideration Dismissing Appeal and Sanctions for Acts Under Color of Law in
Violation of the US 14 th Amendment Due Process and Violation of Rights, which motion was
denied by the Supreme Court on April 16, 2010. R. Vol. 1(2012), p. 67.
While the second appeal was pending (on and off), the Thomasons filed three motions
including: (1.) Defendants' Joint Motion for Reconsideration, filed June 26, 2009 by Byron
Thomason and 1v1arilynn Thomason. R. Vol. 4, p. 718; (2.) Defendants· Joiner Joint Motion for
Reconsideration Fraud Upon the Court, filed July 8, 2009 by Nicholas Thomason, Sandra
Thomason, Byron Thomason and Marilynn Thomason. R. Vol. 4., p. 734A; and (3.) Joint
Objection and Second Motion for Reconsideration July 15, 2009 Order, filed July 20, 2009 (one
such motion from Byron, Marilynn and Nicholas Thomason and an identical one from Sandra
Thomason). R. Vol. 4., p. 816. The district court held a hearing on these motions on August 10,
2009. R. Vol. 4.. p. 839. The district court entered its Order Denying the Thomasons' Motions
for Reconsideration on August 11, 2009. R. Vol. 4., p. 846.
On July 16, 2010, the Thomasons filed Defendants' Motion for a Certificate to Appeal
Respondent's Brief
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IRCP Rule 54(b). R. Vol 1(2012), ROA Report p. 8. On August 2, 2010, the District Court held
a hearing on, among other things, the Thomasons' Motion for a Certificate to Appeal IRCP Rule
54(b), at which it ruled that the motion would be treated as one for summary judgment on the
issues of subject matter jurisdiction and standing, and as a motion for reconsideration of the
partition decision. R. Vol. 1(2012), p. 72. On August 4, 2010, Thomasons filed their Joint
Amended Notice of Appeal. R. Vol. 1(2012), p. 75. On August 6, 2010, Thomasons filed with
the Supreme Court their Joint Motion for Permission to Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court
from a District Court Lacking Subject Matter Jurisdiction Involving a Complaint for a Partition
of Real Property by a Plaintiff Who Lacks Standing to Sue, See Order Denying Joim Motion for
Permission to Appeal IC 35-601. at R. Vol. 1(2012), p. 82. The same motion was filed with the
District Court on August 10, 2012. R. Vol. 1 (2012), ROA, p. 9. On September 10, 2010, the
Supreme Court issued its Order denying the Thomasons' Joint Motion for Permission to Appeal
to the Idaho Supreme Court from a District Court Lacking Subject Matter Jurisdiction Involving
a Complaint for a Partition of Real Property by a Plaintiff Who Lacks Standing to Sue, IC 35601. R. Vol. 1(2012), p.82.
On April 4, 2011 District Court held a hearing on Thomasons' motion for summary
judgment and motion for reconsideration. On May 26, 2011, the District Court issued its
Memorandum Decision on All Pending Motions, in which it denied the Thomasons' motion for
summary judgment and motion for reconsideration. R. Vol. 1(2012), p. 89.
On June 16, 2011, the Thomasons filed a Motion to Recuse and their Objection to the
Respondent's Brief
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May 26, 2011 Memorandum Decision on All Pending Issues. R. Vol. 1(2012), ROA, p. 11. On
July 6, 2011 the District Court issued its Order Denying Thomasons· Motion to Recuse. R. Vol.
1(2012). p. 100.
On June 28, 2011 Thomasons filed their Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Refusal
to Recuse. R. Vol. 1(201.'.2), ROA, p. 12. On July 18, 2011 a hearing was held on the Motion for
Reconsideration, and the Motion for Reconsideration was denied. R. Vol. 1(2012 ), p. 103.
On August 19, 2011 ivfRP filed its Notice of Taking Deposition. R. Vol 1(2012), ROA p.
12. On August 24, 2011 the Thomasons filed their Objections to Depositions Subpoena and
Byron T. Thomason and Marilyn Thomason, defendants, Joint Objection and Motion to Quash
and Modify IRCP Rule 45(d) Comi Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction. R. Vol. 1(2012), ROA p.
12. On October 13,201 L the court filed its Minute Entry and Order denying the Thomasons'
motion to quash and motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. R. Vol. 1(2012),
p. 104.
On January 12, 2012, MRP moved to dismiss the remaining claims. R. Vol. 1(2012), p.
123. On February 2, 2012, MRP's remaining claims were dismissed on its motion and Final
Judgment entered. R. Vol. 1(2012), p. 129. On February 10, 2012, Thomasons filed their
Motion for Reconsideration. R. Vol. 1(2012), ROA p. 16. On March 13, the court entered its
Order denying the Thomasons' Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Dismissal. R. Vol.
1(2012), p. 135.
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3. Statement

ci the facts.

Prior to partition, MRP was the owner of a one-third undivided interest in a 75-acre tract
of farm ground located in Madison County, Idaho, generally referred to as the "Farmstead" by the
parties. R. Vol.

L

p. 51-52. MRP is the successor in interest to William Forsberg who received

his one-third tmdivided interest in the F annstead by a deed from Greg and Diana Thomason
recorded October 30, 2001, and a correction warranty deed recorded March 29, 2002. R. Vol. 1.,
pp. 85 and 86. Forsberg and his wife conveyed the property to MRP. LLC by a Warranty Deed, a
later Correction Warranty Deed and a Second Correction Warranty Deed. R. Vol 2, pp. l 62-164
and R. Vol. 1(2012), p. 94. Marilynn and Byron Thomason were the owners of a one-third
undivided interest in the Farmstead property. Nicholas and Sandra Thomason were the owners of
a one-third undivided interest in the Farmstead property. R. Vol. 2., p. 166.
The Thomasons brought suit against MRP' s predecessor in interest, William Forsberg, in
the United States Banlauptcy Court for the District ofldaho seeking, among other things, to quiet
title to the Fam1steacl property in Thomason Farms, Inc. R. Vol. 1., pp. 53, 59, 60, 63. 64.
Forsberg answered and counterclaimed denying all of the Thomasons' allegations and requesting
that the Banlauptcy Comi quiet title in a one-third undivided interest in the Farmstead property
in him. R. Vol. 2., p. 174-180. Following a trial on the merits, in a Memorandum Decision dated
June 9, 2006, the Bankruptcy Court found against the Thomasons and in favor of Forsberg on all
claims. In a final judgment dated October 3, 2006, the Bankruptcy Court then quieted title to a
one-third undivided fee simple interest in the Farmstead property in William Forsberg subject to
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any c01mnunity interest of his spouse. R. Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 24, p. 78. 2
The Thomasons appealed the Bankruptcy Court's decision against them to the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Their appeal was denied and
the bankruptcy court's decision upheld in all respects by Judgment entered August 7, 2007. R.
Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 25, p. 2 of the Memorandum. No further appeal was
taken from this decision. R. Vol. 1.. p. 122.
On September 11, 2007, the Thomasons filed a document with the Bankruptcy Court
entitled "Joint Affidavits of Nicholas A. Thomason and Byron T. Thomason" which included
within it an attached document entitled "Demand for Retrial Fraud Upon the' Comi.'' R. Vol. 1.,
pp. 87-106. (emphasis in original).
On October 26, 2007, Byron Thomason filed an Affidavit of Plaintiff Byron T.
Thomason, Fraud On the Court Bankruptcy Fraud, Exhibits & Claims with a supplement
consisting of Exhibits A through I and Exhibits 1 through 3. R. Vol. 3., pp. 361-630. The
document purported to detail, among other things, alleged acts and omissions by William
Forsberg in concert with Greg and Diana Thomason, the bankruptcy trustee and other defendants
which were characterized as fraud, fraud on the court, real estate fraud and crimes, which should
have voided the conveyance of the Farmstead property. R. Vol. 3., pp. 386,391, 395-396.
A hearing was held on the Thomasons' motion for relief from judgment and for a new

2

This affidavit and its exhibits were submitted by the Clerk of the District Court with the
Record herein. See R. Vol. 4., second to the last page (Certificate of Exhibits).
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trial on October 31, 2007. R. Vol. 1., p. 117; Vol.

1 . The bankruptcy court entered its

Memorandum Decision and Order on November

2007 in which it denied the Thomasons'
Vol. 1., pp. 120-136. The court

motion for relief from the prior judgment and for a new trial.
further ordered that. to the extent the Fraud on

Court document filed by the Thornasons

constituted a separate request for relief, it was denied. R. Vol. 1 pp. 137-138. No appeal was
taken from the decision of the bankruptcy court. R. Vol. 2., pp.

(Bankruptcy Court

Docket Report reflects that no notice of appeal was filed following the entry of the bankruptcy
court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion
appeal has passed and the Thomasons did not appeal

The time for filing an

banhuptcy court's ~ovember 26, 2007

order.
On September 26, 2008, Appellants Nicholas Thomason and Sandra Thomason filed a
Demand for Retrial and Motion to Dismiss Banlauptcy in

banlauptcy court cases. They were

joined in their demand and motion later by Marilynn and Byron Thomason. After a hearing on
December 10, 2008, the Honorable Jim D. Pappas entered his Order wherein the Demand for
Retrial and Motion to Dismiss Banlauptcy was denied.

Affidavit of William Forsberg,

Exhibit 25, p. 4 of the Memorandum, lines 2-8. The Thomasons' latest motion in bankruptcy
court was again based on their allegation of fraud on the court. R. Fifth Affidavit of William
Forsberg, Exhibit 25, p. 4 of the Memorandum. lines

16.

On December 19, 2008, the Tho masons :filed a notice of appeal of the Banhuptcy Court's
Order denying their motion to dismiss banhuptcy. R. Fifth Affidavit of William
Exhibit 25, p. 5 of the Memorandum, lines 2-4. On December 22, 2008 the Thomasons filed
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their Notice of Appeal on the Bankruptcy Court's Order denying their demand for a new trial. R.
Fifth Affidavit of \.Villiam Forsberg, Exhibit 25. p. 5 of the Memorandum. lines 4-6. In their
briefs, the Thomasons expanded their issues to include their contention that the banlauptcy court
deliberately suppressed previously submitted documents to assist the trustee in obtaining an
illegal claim to an asset. The bankruptcy court judge allegedly did this because a member of his
former law firm represented one of the parties in the litigation. R. Fifth Affidavit of William
'
E'Xnl
'.b.1t ...1 ),
- p. ~;
F orsoerg,

OJ.r: th e

1' "
dum, 1·mes_)-_
r 1 8; p. 8, 1·mes 1-.)."'
memoran

On June 26, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
entered its Judgment affirming the Bankruptcy Comi's judgment and Order of December 10,
2008. R. Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg. Exhibit 25 (2 nd unnumbered page). The Thomasons
subsequently filed a petition for further review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
petition has been denied. Neither the Farmstead property, nor any of the parties to this action are
subject to any stay issued by the bankruptcy court. R. Vol. 2. p. 154.
The only persons or entities with any ownership claim in the Fannstead are parties to this
action. R. Vol. 2. p. 166. The plaintiff requested by letter that the Thomasons voluntarily

:, In rejecting this argument the appellate court stated, "Even though neither the AP
Demand nor the Case Demand refers to bias of the judge, and even though this is not an appeal
of a motion for disqualification or recusal of the judge, the Appellants request that we reverse on
these grounds. We will not do so, as these arguments have been raised for the first time on
appeal, ... Moreover, Appellants are requesting us to consider evidence not presented to the
bankruptcy court in the context of the AP demand and the Case Demand .... Rather they have
appended to their opening brief four documents that were not mentioned in the AP Demand or in
the Case Demand ... Because the four documents appended to the Appellants' briefs were not
presented to the bankruptcy court in the context of the AP Demand and the Case Demand, we
caimot consider them in this appeal." (Citations omitted).
Respondent's Brief
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negotiate a partition of the Farmstead. They refused to do so. R. Vol.

L pp. 21-22A. The other

interests include the attorney's lien of Jay Kohler which attaches to the ownership interest of the
Thomasons and the property tax arrearage owed to Madison County. R. Vol. 1., p. 18.

II. Additional Issues Presented on Appeal
MRP is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs against the appellant, Marilynn
Thomason.

III. Argument
1. The district court had jurisdiction over the subiect matter of this case.

Thomason's argument that the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is
derivative of her assertion that MPJJ lacks standing. Thomason's basis for claiming lack of
standing is that the deed conveying the property at issue in this case to MRP did not contain a
complete address as required by I.C. § 55-601. Therefore, Thomason asks this Court to reverse
and void all District Com1 orders, decisions and judgments.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a key requirement for the justiciability of a claim and cannot
be waived by consent of the parties. Sierra L[fe Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626, 586 P.2d
1068, 1070 (1978). Because of the serious ramifications of a court acting without subject matter
jurisdiction, namely that the judgments of that court are void, the concept must be clearly
defined. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction was first defined in Richardson v. Ruddy, a case dealing
with the predecessor to Idaho Code section 6-501, the statute in issue here:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial power over
that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather the abstract power to try a
case of the kind or character of the one pending; and not whether the particular case is
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one that presents a cause of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court
in which it is pending, because of some of the inherent facts that exist and may be
developed during trial. Richardson v. Ruddy 15 Idaho 488, 494-95, 98 P. 842, 844 (1908 ).
This Court has adopted a presumption that courts of general jurisdiction have subject
matter jurisdiction unless a party can show otherwise. Borah v. McCandless, 14 7 Idaho 73, 78,
205 P.3d 1209, 1214 (2009).
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 1-705, district courts have "original jurisdiction in all cases and
proceedings." The Idaho Constitution also grants district courts general jurisdiction "in all cases,
both at law and in equity.'· Idaho Constitution, Art. 5, § 20. Accordingly, an Idaho district court
may hear any case not specifically excluded from its purview. The Supreme Court has also
adopted a presumption that courts of general jurisdiction have subject matter jurisdiction unless a
party can show otherwise. Borah. V McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 78,205 P.3d 1209, 1214 (2009).
Notwithstanding the Court's general jurisdiction, it is clear that district courts in Idaho
have specific jurisdiction over partition of real estate cases. See Troup is v. Summer, 148 Idaho
77. 218 P.3d 1138 (2009) (stating that the district court is vested with the authority to apportion
the proceeds of a sale of jointly held property.)See also I.C. §§ 6-522 and 6-542 which reference
the authority of a district court in partition cases. Thomason has failed to articulate a legally
cognizable reason to strip the Court of its presumed jurisdiction.
2. MRP has standing to brin!:'. this case.
Thomason argues that MRP did not have standing to bring this action. Standing is a
subcategory of justiciability and is "a preliminary question to be detem1ined by this Court before
reaching the merits of the case." Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 lda,½o 389,391, 128 P.3d 926, 928
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(2006). The basis of Thomason's argument is that MRP has no interest in the Farmstead property
because a deed to IvfRP did not have a "complete address." 4
"The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the
party wishes to have adjudicated.'' Jvliles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,641, 778 P.2d 757,
763 (1989). To satisfy the requirement of standing. litigants must allege an injury in fact. a fairly
traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct, and a
substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury.

Troutner v. Kcmpthornc, 142 Idaho 389,391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006).
In an earlier case before this Court in which Thomason was also an appellant and in
which she raised the same issue, the Court held as follows:

-

Thomason· s standing arguments are based upon contentions re .._.,garding........ the validitv of the
warranty deed. They contend, 'The respondents lacked standing under Idaho Statutes 55601, 55-813, 9-503, 45-901 and 902.' They do not argue the applicability of any of those
statutes except Idaho Code § 55-601. However, we need not address that statute with
respect to their standing argument.
~

_._

./

As stated above, standing focuses upon the party seeking relief and not upon the merits of
the issues that are to be litigated. Thomasons contend that under Idaho Code § 55-601,
Bagleys should have lost on the merits of their claim that they had title to the real
property. A party's standing to bring an action is an issue that is entirely separate from the
issue of whether the party will prevail on the merits of the action. Section 55-601 has
nothing to do with standing. As the record owners of the real property, Bagleys have
standing to bring their quiet title action.

Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799,802,241 P.3d 977 (Idaho 2010).

4

Idaho Code§ 55-601 provides that "[a] conveyance of an estate in real property may be
made by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent
thereunto authorized by vvriting. The name of the grantee and his complete mailing address must
appear on such instrument."
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MRP is the grantee of warranty deeds conveying the real property to it. The deeds were
executed by the Fors bergs and were recorded at the request of First American Title Company
with the lmowledge of and at the direction of the grantors. R. Vol. 1, p. 151. "[R]ecordation of
the deed at the grantor's lmowledge and direction evidences a valid delivery of the deed to the
grantee which encompasses the requisite intent of the grantor to pass title." Hartley v. Stibor, 96
Idaho 157, 160, 525 P .2d 352, 355 (1974); Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799,802,241 P.3d
977 (2010). As the grantee of the deed. MRP clearly had standing to bring a quiet title action.
3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion.
a. The Disrrict Court did not ignore Idaho Code §55-601 and its decision
regarding subject matterjurisdiction 1<vas not error.

Thomason argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss the case
after she "made the suggestion'· that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction by ignoring Idaho Code
§ 55-601, Idaho R Civ P 12(g)(4), 17(a) and 54(d).

Thomason's argument is an extension of the argument made that the District Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and that MRP lacked standing. The main thrust of the argument is that
it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to rule in favor of MRP. The evidence in the
record supports the District Court's finding that there was subject matter jurisdiction.
Initially, the address on the deeds in question was "Madison Real Property, LLC,
Rexburg, Idaho 83440". The final conected deed contained MRP's street address. All the deeds
had complete and correct legal descriptions, named MRP as the grantee at its address, and were
recorded by the Madison County Recorder.
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First .American Title Company issued a litigation guarantee which was in evidence before
the court in which First American examined the state of title and issued its finding that fee simple
"title to the estate or interest in the [Farmstead property] was vested in Madison Real Property,
LLC, Byron Thomason, also shown as Byron T. Thomason, and Nicholas Thomason ... each as
to an undivided one-third interest." R. Vol. 2. p. 166, L.5. Idaho law recognizes that the
information provided in a title report is primafacia evidence of a conveyance. 5
Idaho case law recognizes that an address containing sufficient information to identify
and locate an addressee is a "complete address" for purposes of conveying real estate. In Adams
11•

Anderson. 142 Idaho 208, 210-211, 127 P.3d 111, 113-114 (2005), the Supreme Court held

that a Record of Survey containing the name of the grantee, although the record "does not state
outright that Oberbillig is the grantee, a glance at the smvey shows he is receiving part of Myers
property, making him the grantee. Finally, although Oberbillig's address is not shown, the lot,
block, street county, and city are all shown on the Record of Survey ... Given the amount of
detail provided in the Record of Survey, it would not be difficult to ascertain Oberbillig's street
address." See also Ci~y ofKellogg v. }vlission Afountain Interests Ltd.. Co., 135 Idaho 239, 16
P .3d 915 (2000) (a conveyance agreement providing only the name of the city contained a
sufficient address since the City of Kellogg is a well-known municipality in Idaho).

lnKeb Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 101 P.3d 690 (2004), the Supreme

5

I.C. 54-102. Certificate of abstracter -- Effect. When any abstracter is certified, ... [it]
shall entitle such ... title report to real estate, ce1iified to or countersigned and issued by such
abstracter, to be received in all courts as prima facie evidence of the existence of the record of
deeds, m01igages and other instruments, conveyances, or liens, affecting the real estate
mentioned in such ... title report, and that such record is as described in said ... title report.
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Court held that an address on a quitclaim deed consisting of "Carmen, Lemhi County, Idaho'·
was sufficient to comply with Idaho Code § 55-601. The district court held that even though the
grantee may have had a post office box. because Cam1en, Idaho, was sparsely populated, the
address consisting only of the to\\TI and county was sufficient.
After reviewing all the evidence, the District Court, in its Memorandum Decision on all
Pending Motions, held, with regard to the address issue:
The case at hand is analogous to those cited above. Rexburg is a moderately sized city in
which there is only one entity existing under the name of Madison Real Property, LLC. A
simple search of the Secretary of State's webpage would reveal as much. The undisputed
affidavit of William Forsberg asserts that multiple government agencies such as the
Madison County Treasurer's Office and the U.S. Department of Agriculture were able to
correspond with MRP using the "address" on the deed. Therefore, they argue that
Thomasons could have done the same. Most importantly, Thomasons had actual
knowledge of the owner of the property. They had been co-tenants with (and legal
adversaries of) Mr. Forsberg and MRP for a substantial period of time.
R. Vol. 4 (2012), p. 93.
The address on the deeds filed prior to the commencement of the case before the District
Court were sufficient to be a complete address under the standards the Supreme Court has
applied in similar cases. The District Court considered the evidence before it and the applicable
law in determining that there was subject matter jurisdiction and its decision was in accord with
both.
b. The district court did not abuse its discretion by making an award cf costs and
fees to MRP where it had a statutory and.factual basis for doing so and -where there were no
objections by the Thomasons to the a-wards.

Thomason argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to award costs
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and fees to MRP.
The District Court awarded costs and fees to MRP in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. in its Order of October 20, 2008, in its
Memorandum Decision filed June 12. 2009, and in its Order Denying Thomasons' Motions for
Reconsideration filed August l L 2009. Idaho Code § 6-545 provides for the costs of partition,
including reasonable counsel.fees, expended by the plaintiff ... ·'VVhen, however, litigation
arises berween some of the parties onZv, the court may require the expense C?f such litigation to
be paid by the parties thereto, or a1~v of them.,. (emphasis added.).

The District Court found that attorneys fees and costs incurred by the plaintiff were
necessary to accomplish the partition of the property. R. Vol. 2, p. 250. The actual fees and costs
awarded MRP were awarded pursuant to the procedure set forth in IRCP, R.ule 54, and were not
objected to by the Thomasons. R. Vol. 2, pp. 255,262,268; Vol 4, pp. 667,670, 726 and 814.
An objection to claimed costs must be made by filing a motion to disallow part or all of those
costs within 14 days of service of the memorandum of costs. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(6) The
Thomasons never filed a timely objection to the claimed costs. "Failure to timely object to the
items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed.

Id. Thus by failing to timely object, Thomason has waived any objections to the costs claimed.
The awards granted prior to the entry of final judgment were interlocutory and subject to
being revised or vacated. Baker v. Pencby, 98 Idaho 745, 748, 572 P.2d 179, 182 (1977); Idaho
R. Civ. P. 54(6)(1 ). The District Court's Minute Entry and Order R.e: Dismissal stated
"Defendants may be entitled to costs in this matter and were instructed to file their claims for
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costs within fourteen (14} days from today's date."

Vol. 4 (201

p. 124. The Thomasons

to the costs alreadv. awarded. The
never filed anv
. claim for costs and did not at that time object
.

having been fully adjudicated, this sha[ be
LR.C.P. 54(a)." The defendants did nor file

as a final judgement for all purposes of
memorandum of costs or other motion regarding

costs thereafter.
The District Court did not abuse

awarding attorney fees and costs in this

case.

c. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it did not permit the trial of
issues not pied and not otherwise

l't..

Thomason argues that the District Court abused its discretion by not permitting a trial on
their counterclaim. The District Court, in its Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Remaining Claims,
stated that
Thomasons failed to produce a copy of, or provide any evidence concerning, their
purported counterclaim. The Court. advised the parties that it had been unable to locate a
counterclaim in the record. The Court noted that it found two pleadings that contained the
word 'countercomplainf in the caption, but the term had been crossed out (apparently by
Thomasons) and replaced with the handwritten term "Appeallants'' [sic]. The footers to
both documents used "Appeallant's" or "Appellant's" rather than "counterclaim". Most
importantly, neither document contained
actual counterclaims or requests for an
accounting of property taxes. There is simply no evidence on the record that Thomasons
ever asserted a counterclaim for an accounting of the property taxes.'· R. Vol. 1 (2012) p.
130.
Thomason has not cited anywhere in the record where the parties consented to try a
counterclaim that was not plead. Thomason has not cited or

Respondent's Brief

Page 18

any argument or authority as

to why the District Court is required to try counterclaims that have never been pled or where the
parties have not expressly agreed to try such claims.
"We will not consider assignments of enor not supported by argument and authority in
the opening brief." Hogg r. rVolske, 142 Idaho 549. 559, 130 P .3d 1087, 1097 (2006). Issues
raised on appeal that are not supported by propositions of !av,, or authority are deemed waived
and will not be considered. H'hceler v. Idaho Dept. cfHealth & We{fare, 147 Idaho 257,207 P.3d
988 (2009); LA.R. 35(a)(6). "Because [the appellant] failed entirely to support her argument with
citations to any evidence in the record or relevant legal authority. this Court declined to review
the argument." A1ichalk v. 1vlichalk. 148 Idaho 224, 230, 220 P.3d 580, 586 (2009).
The District Court did no1 abuse its discretion by declining to hold a trial to hear
counterclaims that had not been plead, where the parties had not consented to such at trial.
4. Thomason was not denied equal protection.
Thomason argues for the first time on appeal that the District Court denied her equal
protection under the rules, statutes, case lav,: and 14th Amendment equal protection clause.
Although stated as equal protection, the argument appears to be a restatement of the abuse of
discretion arguments and jurisdictional arguments discussed above.
"It is a well settled rule that an equal protection analysis comes into play when a statute--a
legislative enactment--creates two classes of individuals who are treated differently." State v.
Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230,233, 743 P.2d 459,463 (1987): See Stucki v. Loveland, 94 Idaho 621,

495 P.2d 571 (1972). Thomason does not articulate what two classes are involved in this case
and how the judgment of the District Court treated her differently from another class. Thomason
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does not cite any authority to support her argument that the rulings of the District Court violate
the equal protection clause. The Court should not consider
and authority. See Hogg, Wheeler and Milchack, supra.
The issue regarding denial of equal protection raised by Thomason is not supported by
citations to legal authority or facts in the record should not be reviewed by this court.
5. MRP is entitled to its Attornev's Fees on Apueal.
MRP is entitled to an award of attorney fees for this appeal.

statutory basis for such

an award is Idaho Code§ 6-545. which states:
The costs of partition, including reasonable counsel
expended by the plaintiff or
either of the defendants for the common benefit, fees ofrc,·t·pr,~PC'· and other
disbursements. must be paid by the parties respectively entitled to share in the lands
divided, in proportion to their respective interests therein, and may be included and
specified in the judgment. In that case they shaE be a lien on the several shares, and the
judgment may be enforced by execution against such shares and against other property
held by the respective parties. When, however. litigation arises between some of the
parties only, the court may require the expense of such litigation to
paid by the parties
thereto, or any of them.
appeal was brought by Marilynn Thomason from the judgment of the district court
partitioning the real prope1iy jointly held by the Thomasons and MRP. It is necessary for MRP to
respond to the appeal in order to secure the partition of the real property. lf MRP is the prevailing

party in this appeal it should be awarded its costs, including its attorney's
cost of partition as set fmih above.
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against her as a

V. Conclusion
The District Court's judgment should be affim1ed. The District Court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case. MRP had standing to bring its partition action. The District
Court did not abuse its discretion or commit prejudicial error. Thomason was not denied equal
protection.
MRP should be awarded its attorney fees and costs for this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 13 th day of November, 2012.

William Forsberg
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